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used to assess trends and structure uncertainty. Empirical data also helped to describe three future scenarios that 
oscillate between the continuation of current agro-neoliberal trends (facilitated by the appropriation of sustainability 
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developments would require a strong coordination of national and international social groups and political will to 
construct a different future for farmers, consumers and wider society. 
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1. Agro-neoliberalism as the emerging force of agribusiness expansion 
The article deals with the recent past of Brazilian agriculture, its current configuration 
and structural trends and, finally, some plausible future scenarios. This analysis is particularly 
relevant taking into account the need to feed and nourish a growing population, as well as the 
wide range of conflicting interests associated with the expansion of agri-food production and 
export (Ioris, 2015). There is growing understanding that the modernization and intensification 
of agriculture are key factors of modern-day capitalism (Busch & Bain, 2004). In particular, 
agricultural development has been affected by the transition to post-Fordist modes of 
production under the sphere of influence of neoliberalism (McMichael, 2009). That has been 
especially evident in so-called New Agricultural Countries, such as Brazil, that have occupied an 
increasing market share and now compete with traditional agro-exporting nations of Western 
Europe and the United States. To a large extent, it has represented a conversion of food 
production to agriculture as business (that is, agribusiness or commercial agriculture). One of the 
striking features of this debate is that, although agricultural production and productivity (OECD, 
2016), as well as agribusiness activities  (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012) have increased 
considerably in the last few years, various problems still affect the reliability of food supply and 
undermine the food security prospect of rural and urban populations (Hubert et al., 2010). 
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Changes in government and market structures have been promoted under the promise of higher 
efficiency and globalized trade, but in that process existing and new contradictions seem to 
undercut the possibilities of fair development and a better life to all. 
Here we offer a critical investigation into the implementation of neoliberal agricultural 
policies, using Brazil as a relevant case study, considered as the realization and culmination of the 
encroachment of capitalist relations of production upon agri-food systems. The need to feed a 
large, hungry population has been on the agenda of international development for many decades 
(see Borgstrom, 1969), although in the 1970s it became evident that the problem was not merely 
quantitative, but significant reforms were required (Rush et al., 1978). Since the end of the 1980s, 
the work led by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank has tried to reconcile agricultural 
economic growth and the reduction of rural poverty with incentives and institutional 
adjustments aimed to increase land productivity and the promotion of free trade and land 
markets (Pereira, 2015). Gradually, and related to wider politico-economic reforms, instead of 
pursuing ecological and collectivist strategies, the politico-economic circumstances favoured a 
neoliberalizing pathway, translated in processes ranging from adjustments of small-scale farming 
and local economies to the escalation of agro-industrial production, the monopolization of trade 
(upstream and downstream to the farm gate and the household), the widespread financialization 
of agriculture (including future markets and agriculture derivatives) and the subjugation of public 
policies to strong market pressures (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). As a result, contemporary agri-food 
systems under neoliberalizing pressures are increasingly focused on short-term economic gains, 
land concentration, environmental impacts and the legitimization of political hegemonies at the 
expense of issues of nourishment and health (Shiva, 2004). Neoliberalism’s influence on 
agriculture is a highly idiosyncratic phenomenon that combines free-market pressures and 
flexibilization approaches with renewed forms of protectionism, trade barriers and labour 
movement restrictions (Potter & Tilzey, 2005).  
Agri-food has certainly become one of the most globalized sectors in the modern-day 
economy, as the production and consumption of products are now truly global affairs (Bonanno 
& Constance, 2008). Nonetheless, most of the critical literature on agriculture and neoliberalism 
has so far focused on the more readily identifiable features, such as the intensification of trade 
and financial flows or the evident influence of transnational corporations (TNCs), but left rather 
too implicit the geographical specificities and contested materialization of what can be described 
as ‘agro-neoliberalism’. Although agro-neoliberalism is a sectoral expression of state and market 
reforms under the influence of flexibilization and financialization pressures (Harvey, 2005), it is 
necessary to further theorize and examine its consequences and ramifications. The 
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neoliberalization of agriculture is a contingent, place-specific convergence of various production 
and commercialization practices organized according to an ideological construct that privileges 
marked-based policies and the intensification of capital circulation and accumulation without 
ever removing the state from the spheres of production, commercialization and legitimization. It 
largely follows the fetishism of free-market relations while at the same time perpetuates calls for 
state interventions aimed, for instance, to mitigate price oscillations and avoid over-production. 
More importantly, agro-neoliberalism seems to offer the prospect of a bright future based on the 
intensification of market exchange and rapid accumulation of capital. It is permeated by the 
promise of shared progress, while in effect it reinforces mechanisms of exclusion and 
exploitation. As the analysis below will show, the result is the contamination of the present with 
the mythic announcement, and tacit locking-in, of a future shaped by present day agribusiness.   
In that challenging context, with new production areas and growing productivity, Brazil 
has consolidated its position as a global leader, and even as a ‘model’ of commercial, integrated 
crop production (Collier, 2008). Unlike other economic sectors (such as industrial activity and 
retail markets), neoliberal agribusiness is considered an island of prosperity and economic 
dynamism. It should be noted that, due to promotional campaigns and assertive public policies, 
the term ‘agribusiness’ has a particularly positive, and strategic, connotation in Brazil, where it is 
commonly used in reference to large plantation farms. More importantly, although the expansion 
of agribusiness has proved to be central to Brazil’s participation in globalized markets, it has 
revealed a peculiar amalgamation of tradition and modernity, evolving through new social orders 
and old political structures. In practice, the sustained claims of the success of agribusiness have 
paved the way for the consolidation of the hegemony of agro-neoliberalism in the country, as a 
highly idiosyncratic phenomenon that evolved through numerous and innovative associations 
between the state apparatus and the national and international private sector. 
The research project that informed our discussion, carried out between 2013 and 2015, 
comprised repeated visits to cropping areas, private companies, research centres, farming 
communities, attendance at public meetings and semi-structured interviews carried out in the 
Brazilian states of São Paulo and Mato Grosso. The focus was on the neoliberalization and 
intensification of agribusiness in Brazil, as an entry point into the politicized geographies of 
globalized agri-food and into the complexity of agro-neoliberalism at national and sub-national 
levels. What follows in the next pages is a space-sensitive assessment and theorization of social 
relations and socio-economic trends across different scales and times, which, according to 
Callinicos (2007), should concentrate on the main dimensions of power, especially economic 
activity, ideologies and various patterns of political domination. The study particularly considered 
4 
 
the emblematic situation of Brazilian agribusiness and particularly its evolution in Mato Grosso, 
in the Centre-West region, which since the 1990s has become one of the main hubs of agro-
neoliberalism in the world. From being a region with relatively low levels of isolated economic 
activity, Mato Grosso is now at the core of national economic life and plays a key role in 
Brazilian exports and global agri-food markets.  
Our fieldtrip campaigns were particularly concentrated in the main soybean production 
areas in the Upper Teles Pires River Basin, around the main cities of Sorriso, Lucas do Rio Verde 
and Sinop, in the north of Mato Grosso. The research included prospective visits to farms, 
government agencies and private companies, followed by formal interviews and follow up 
discussions. It also involved spending time in the farms interacting with landowners, their 
families and farm workers. The aim was to contrast the perspective of different stakeholder 
groups, such as long-term residents and new arrivals, small- and large-scale farmers, policy-
makers and private company managers, social and biophysical scientists (especially at Embrapa, 
the national agricultural research facility) and representatives of economic sector and organized 
civil society. Two sets of questions were prepared, one for national players in São Paulo and one 
for farmers and local authorities in Mato Grosso (all participants in those two groups were asked 
the same questions about the process of change, about risks, conflicts and difficulties, and about 
impacts, possibilities and prospects). With the help of local academics, interviewees and 
informants were identified, initial contacts were set up, and the research then followed a 
snowball approach. Based on preliminary information, a database was developed to guide further 
interviews, documentation analysis and the collection of background information. With the 
mapping of sectors and organizations, their discourse and stated aims, it was possible to compare 
intra- and inter-group differences and the range of alliances or disputes. Interviews were 
complemented with analysis of documents, statistics, websites, leaflets, presentations and 
newspaper articles found in university libraries and in the archives of public agencies and private 
entities. 
The information and the material accumulated though the research were then used to 
build future scenarios of agribusiness and agro-neoliberalism in Mato Grosso. The goal here was 
to produce a foresight study that takes a systematic look at the future in order to draw 
conclusions about current problems and subtle tensions (as suggested by Schwab et al., 2003). It 
is consistent with the observation by Bourgeois (2016) that futures studies in agriculture should 
focus on social and political forces as potential sources of discontinuities, paying particular 
attention to food insecurity and addressing ruptures and discontinuities rather than simply 
trends. That also meant developing a critical analysis of long-term developments and considering 
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the likely barriers to shape a more democratic and inclusive future at local and national levels. 
The next pages contain a qualitative analysis of existing policies, the influence of previous 
experiences and macroeconomic assumptions influencing the future of the agricultural farming 
sector. In addition, scenario analysis was employed as a tool for dealing with complexity and 
uncertainty, which requires a methodical and internally consistent approach for building 
narratives about the future of food and agriculture (Dijk, 2012; Giaoutzi et al., 2012). The 
approach used here also followed the observation of Folhes et al. (2015) that most scenario 
studies in the Amazon have been limited to deforestation trends at a broad scale and less is 
known about communities and the exercise of authority. In the present case, future scenarios 
informed the assessment of factors that are rarely included in the discussion about agro-
neoliberalism in Mato Grosso, such as sustainability and justice. Dias et al. (2016) further 
emphasize that scenarios can help to reveal the key role of territorialized processes and social, 
political and environmental aspects of agriculture and the rural economy. Finally, a foresight 
process helps to understand ongoing transformations and expose the inadequacies of policies 
and the demand for better, more inclusive agriculture production systems (Maggio et al., 2016). 
It is to the contentious experience of agro-neoliberalism in Mato Grosso and in South America 
that we now turn. 
 
2. The present and the recent past of Brazilian agro-neoliberalism 
Brazilian agriculture has famously evolved, since colonial times, through the strategic 
association of export crops and staple food produced by subsistence farming, as a politico-
economic compromise dominated by powerful rural elites in strong alliance with the apparatus 
of the colonial and, later, national state (Oliveira, 2007). Agricultural modernization and rural 
development received an important stimulus during the twenty-one year military dictatorship 
(1964-1985), with the incorporation of different forms of capital, new methods of production 
and the formation of agro-industrial chains along the lines of the so-called ‘Green Revolution’ 
(Gonçalves Neto, 1997). Priority was given by the authoritarian governments of the time to 
national-developmentalist policies inspired by Keynesian ideas; these policies involved fiscal 
incentives, subsidized credit, efficiency measures and the integration of farming and industry 
(Delgado, 2012). Crop production was promoted by the federal government throughout the 
country (Oliveira & Stédile, 2005), as an ‘anti-agrarian’ reform that further concentrated land 
ownership and reinforced old agrarian trends. The transition to agro-neoliberalism in the 1990s 
happened because of the insufficiencies of developmentalism (led for several decades by a highly 
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interventionist state) and also to benefit from the new opportunities opened by market 
globalization.  
After achieving remarkable rates of production growth in the 1970s, the state-centralized 
mode of agricultural intensification started to show serious limitations, particularly as Brazil was 
suffering from a public debt crisis, escalating rates of inflation and macroeconomic instability. 
The Brazilian agriculture sector went through a period of turbulence and uncertainty beginning 
in the mid-1980s, due to the reduction of support schemes (e.g. guaranteed prices), significantly 
higher interest rates and a paucity of bank loans. That prompted the transition to what is 
described by Campanhola & Graziano da Silva (2000) as a ‘new rural model’, characterized by 
higher levels of agroindustrial integration, more direct intervention from large corporations 
(including production funding) and multipurpose technologies. This new model was directly 
associated with neoliberal reforms to the state and economy during the 1990s. Inflation 
reduction and macroeconomic stabilization policies – known as the Real Plan, launched in 1994 
and maintained by President Cardoso (1995-2002) – strengthened the national currency, the real 
(R$), and facilitated agro-industrial imports, while at the same time creating circumstantial 
barriers to the export of Brazilian goods for most of the decade (Ioris & Ioris, 2013). A serious 
trade imbalance, together with higher interest rates, led to a temporary reduction in agricultural 
profitability and a lowering of land prices; nonetheless, it also paved the way for the 
advancement of agro-neoliberalism as an alternative strategy for the revitalization of national 
agriculture. Production of crops for export was also encouraged by more favourable exchange 
rates following the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian currency and by extraordinarily favourable 
commodity prices in global markets during the early 2000s (Richards et al., 2012). 
The speedy recovery of Brazilian agriculture, following neoliberalizing priorities, was 
enabled by a combination of public and private measures (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2003). The state 
remained firmly in charge of rural development (Schneider, 2010), but at the same time forged 
close partnerships with an ever-stronger private agribusiness sector. Since then, both 
transnational (Monsanto, ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Dreyfus, etc.) and new national corporations 
(Amaggi, BR Foods, JBS, Marfrig, etc.) have played an increasingly decisive role in terms of 
policy planning and efforts to grow business. Under the populist, neo-developmentalist 
administrations of Presidents Lula (2003-2010) and Dilma (2011-2016), agro-neoliberalism 
became, paradoxically, more deeply entrenched and represented a dialectical return to some of 
the state-led policies of the military, but adopted within the neoliberal frame. The main 
consequence is that in the last decade, while national exports fell significantly due to 
deindustrialisation and an overpriced currency, agribusiness exports maintained an impressive 
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growth. Agricultural exports in 2013 reached a value of US$ 99.97 billion (4.3% more than the 
previous year) with a net surplus (i.e. minus imports) of US$ 82.91 billion (including US$ 30.96 
billion from soybean exports alone). In 2014 the trade balance showed the worst performance 
since 1998 (a deficit of US$ 4.036 billion in 2014, according to the MDIC database) with 
agribusiness appearing as one of the few sectors with positive foreign exchange results. The 
country continues to depend on the financial performance of agribusiness (Valor Econômico, 
2017) and, according to the electronic page of the Ministry of Agriculture, in 2016, Brazilian 
trade produced a surplus of US$ 47.683 billion only because of the contribution of agribusiness 
(the sector produced a surplus of US$ 71.307 billion and the rest of the economy had a deficit of 
US$ 23.624 billion). 
The results of neoliberalized agribusiness were enhanced by supplementary rural credit 
offered by official banks (with annual interest rates of around 5%, significantly lower than the 
standard rates offered by commercial banks). As a somewhat surprising, but integral, element of 
agro-neoliberalism, public credit increased from R$ 15 billion per year in the 1990s to R$ 133 
billion in 2013 and R$ 156 in 2014 (O Estado de São Paulo, 2014). Nonetheless, such public 
funding was overwhelmingly directed to the agribusiness sector, despite the discourse that aims 
to please both agribusiness and family farming. It should also be mentioned new public-private 
alliances (that replaced previous forms of collaboration), techno-economic modernization and 
the reinvention of developmentalist discourses by populist administrations in order to justify 
neoliberalizing policies and prevent opposition. An interesting demonstration of legitimization 
strategies is the appropriation of environmental goals by the agribusiness sector, as in the case of 
the Low Carbon Agriculture Programme [Programa ABC], launched by the federal government in 
2010 to fund the recovery of degraded pastures, cattle-crop integration, forest plantations, etc. 
Another example is the significant proportion of rural credit that has been provided by 
transnational corporations and by a massive increase in bank-like transactions, instead of the 
conventional forms of subsidized rural credit provided by state-owned banks. Since the early 
2000s, various new financial instruments have been available, such as self-financing, financial 
cooperatives, input supplier companies and trading companies, filling the gap created by the 
inadequacies of previous federal government-administered schemes (Serigati, 2013). A notable 
illustration of the widespread financialization of neoliberalized agriculture was the 2004 
legislation that created the Agribusiness Receivables Certificate (CRA), among other titles traded 
on the São Paulo stock exchange. The CRA is a registered credit instrument which links a future 
payment in cash to the debt claim issued by the securitization company. 
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Fuchs et al. (2013) argue that neoliberalized agribusiness logically entails, among other 
adjustments, the increasing use of financial instruments and the pervasive financialization of the 
agri-food sector. In the case of Brazil, the increased financialization of crop production and 
distribution affected not only the relations of production, but directly transformed the nature 
and destination of what is produced. Government investments in agriculture-related 
infrastructure and technological development have become more selective, targeting primarily 
biofuel and export commodities (Bernardes, 1996). Related to policy adjustments, there has been 
a partial replacement of the previous North-South trade priority (especially with the European 
Union) with a growing South-South interconnection, particularly between Brazil and Asia 
(FIESP, 2008). Soybean is by far the most important agricultural commodity in Brazil and the 
‘soybean complex’ accounts for 80% of agricultural exports to China. Soybean is not only an 
emblematic symbol of Brazilian agro-neoliberal modernity and of the success of production 
reorganization. 
An intriguing aspect of the ideological construct of the success of agro-neoliberalism is a 
tendency to systematically blame the government for both large and small adversities (while 
attribute most of the success to the ‘bravery’ of the private sector). Despite the fact that 
agribusiness is in the pockets of transnational corporations – in terms of financing production 
and acquiring most of the goods produced – farmers often call on the state to correct market 
failures and, in bad years, to provide bailout funds. Most farmers tend to accept the legitimacy of 
corporations and focus their criticism on the state for excessive social and environmental 
regulation or for its inability to understand their needs. A key concern in the region, repeated in 
many of our interviews, is ‘logistics’, which means a demand for improved and more reliable 
means of transportation. In the main production areas in the Centre-West of roads are every year 
affected by tropical rains, aggravated by the heavy traffic load. Agribusiness farmers have 
repeatedly attacked the federal government for insufficient investment in roads and, in particular, 
exerted pressure for privatization, which led to 851 kilometres of the federal motorway BR-163 
transferred to a private operator (Odebrecht, a company heavily involved in corruption scandals 
revealed through the Operation Car Wash [Operação Lava Jato] carried out by the Federal Police 
and the Public Attorney Office), following the public-private collaborative strategy of President 
Dilma’s administration.  
Although farmers complain about the price of road transporting grains from the central 
Brazilian states to the international ports in the southeast of Brazil (around R$ 330 or US$ 
110/ton), transportation has not undermined the profitability of soybean or the perennial search 
for new, more distant production areas further afield. One main reason for this is that logistical 
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difficulties have been overcome with inexpensive land in new agricultural frontiers in the centre 
and north of the country, abundant natural resources and cheap labour (it should be noted that 
even though agribusiness farms pay higher median wages than other comparable economic 
sectors, the labour-to-capital ratio is markedly low). The rate of cropland area per employee 
increased significantly between 1970 and 2006 and, because of heavy machinery, it is now 
possible to cultivate very large tracts of land (many thousands of hectares in some farms) with a 
handful of permanent and temporary workers. This is obviously part of the extraction of surplus 
value, and mitigates the increasing tendency to acquire capital in the form of additional farmland 
(Ioris, 2016). This is undeniably a demonstration of the neoliberal nature of present-day 
agribusiness, which aims to produce more and more food, energy and raw materials using less 
and less labour (Moore, 2010). 
 
3. Near-developments and some surprising trends of agro-neoliberalism in Mato Grosso 
Considering the trajectory of agribusiness, briefly discussed above, Brazilian agro-
neoliberalism has evolved through an intricate process of economic gain and aggressive 
modernization intermingled with systematic attempts to conceal strategic alliances between 
populist authorities and market-friendly ideologies. The sector has maintained steady rates of 
expansion not only due to constant technological improvements (e.g. new agrochemicals, 
genetically modified seeds and more sophisticated machinery and digital equipment), but also 
because of further land grabbing and incursion into new production areas (Borras et al., 2012). 
The result is a paradoxical combination of circumstantial profitability and positive results with 
mounting socio-ecological risks and power concentrated in the hands of corporations and rural 
political leaders. The overall impacts and repercussions of the agro-neoliberal experience in 
Brazil can be summarized as four basic ‘near-future developments’, that is, possible prospects 
largely determined by the present (excluding unforeseeable) events and circumstances.  
First, despite positive results in terms of increased production, financing and 
commercialization, the success of neoliberalized agribusiness has left the country dangerously 
over-reliant on primary commodities and on the appetites of distant markets. On the one hand, 
Brazil has become the main global exporter of soybean. On the other hand, the Brazilian 
economy has faced progressive deindustrialization, increased dependence on foreign 
investments, and rising imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods. After the 2008 global 
financial crisis, the dependence of the Brazilian economy on the success of agribusiness extended 
even further as the export of agricultural commodities became the ‘green anchor’ of the 
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economy. While agribusiness grew proportionally less than the national economy in some years, 
its contribution to the national surplus (in dollar terms) remained critical.  
Second, while the difference between export and import values is dwindling in Brazil and 
even tending towards a negative result, the surplus (gross income, i.e. total exports minus total 
imports) produced by the agribusiness sector is positive and constantly growing.  One of the 
most perverse consequences of the steady expansion of agribusiness surpluses is that the activity 
of the contemporary Brazilian state, which combines neoliberalizing priorities with elements of 
populism and neo-Keynesianism, itself depends on agriculture to help manage the monumental 
public debt (around US$ 1 trillion in 2015) and to sustain politically relevant welfare-related 
programmes (such as the important cash transfer scheme known as Bolsa Família). The subaltern 
insertion of Brazil into the globalized economy, beyond the rhetoric of ‘emerging markets’, is 
fraught with inequalities and tensions (Burity, 2008).  
Third, the positive economic results produced by agribusiness have served to unify the 
interests of rural conservative groups and renew processes of political hegemony and class 
domination (Bruno, 2009). Because of its political significance, the agribusiness sector has 
actively managed to protect its interests, especially with an organized and prominent presence in 
the National Congress, where around one third of the senators and deputies belong to, or 
support, the Parliamentary Farming and Cattle Raising Front [Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária]. 
The fourth ‘near-future development’ is related to the fact that there have been growing 
tensions between global commodity chains led by Brazilian agribusinesses and social, grassroots 
movements that call for corporate responsibility, environmental protection, quality food and 
labour rights (Wilkinson, 2011). However, due to the vital role played by agribusiness in 
maintaining macroeconomic stability, and thanks to the political legitimization of populist 
governments, the sector has managed to secure increasing regulatory concessions (such as more 
flexible labour and forestry legislation) and its political capital has served to mitigate bad publicity 
generated by environmental impacts and the regressive social agenda advanced by representatives 
of agribusiness. Systematic campaigns orchestrated by representative entities (for instance, the 
Brazilian Agribusiness Association, the Brazilian Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock, 
and the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo) have tried to counter the prevalent 
image of large-scale farmers as perpetrators of injustice against small-scale farmers and 
indigenous groups and as major contributors to environmental damage in old and new 
production areas.  
The Brazilian region where the controversies related to agro-neoliberalism are most 
evident is the State of Mato Grosso (henceforth ‘MT’), where more than half the economy is 
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now based on agribusiness. The intensification of agriculture in the state since the 1990s has 
revealed an idiosyncratic fusion of old habits and new, market-centred approaches, employed by 
the agribusiness sector in an attempt to consolidate the agriculture frontier (initially opened in 
the 1970s). The neoliberal frontiers of agriculture in Brazil have become ‘export oriented farming 
areas’ with a distinctive influence of farming organizations since the 1990s, especially in terms of 
environmental regulation (Brannstrom, 2009). During our research it was possible to verify that 
agro-neoliberalism is being applied in the localized context of farms and regions, but 
management, technologies and trade relations increasingly happen in accordance with globalized, 
transnational interactions and priorities. However, what is still missing in most available 
publications is a critical examination of the achievements, failures and prospects of agro-
neoliberalism at the geographical frontier of agribusiness; the goal of the next section is to 
provide such an examination. 
The reconfiguration of the patterns of agricultural production in MT constitutes an 
emblematic example of the articulation of public and private agendas that shape agro-
neoliberalism. MT, in the hinterland of Brazil, is one of the most active areas of agricultural 
production for export in the world today, representing the culmination of the rural frontier 
fostered by the government over the past few decades. Since the post-World War II years, MT’s 
state government has been selling large plots of relatively cheap land (typically around 200,000 
hectares) in order to secure revenues to run the public sector and to compensate for the limited 
financial support received from the federal authorities (Moreno, 2007). The agrarian transition 
took a new turn during the military dictatorship, which intensified the occupation of new areas in 
MT through the construction of roads (e.g. the motorways BR-163 and BR-364), warehouses 
and other related infrastructure. Direct federal interventions prompted a number of colonization 
projects in the 1970s and 1980s, which attracted thousands of small famers and landless 
labourers from the south and northeast of Brazil. 
Despite the enthusiasm of the newcomers, the first two decades of the new agriculture 
frontier could be hardly considered a success. On the contrary, farmers struggled to produce due 
to the lack of adapted technology, insufficient preparation for different agro-ecological 
conditions, difficulty selling their products and erratic government support (Barrozo, 2010). 
Technical and socio-ecological barriers faced by the new farmers coincided with the national 
economic crisis of the 1980s, when the government ran out of cash and defaulted on its 
payments. Many had to leave MT, either returning to their original home states or moving 
further into the Amazon region. The late 1980s and early 1990s was a period fraught with 
turbulence and uncertainty about the future of the agriculture frontier. Crucially, it was through 
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the reinvention of the agriculture frontier along the lines of agro-neoliberalism that production 
managed to recover and ended up expanding at an unanticipated pace. MT has been the main 
producer of soybean in Brazil since 1999. Interestingly, the relentless increase of soybean 
production in the state was initially underestimated in most public and private projections, which 
did not anticipate the measures taken to overcome technical, economic and socio-political 
difficulties (Warnken, 2000). 
The celebrated success of agricultural recovery in MT is the result of a convergence of 
the determination in the farming sector and their political influence, the renewed interest of 
transnational corporations in the region, favourable commodity prices and, critically, the growing 
macro-economic importance of crop exports for the national balance of trade. That has required 
the affirmation of a complex institutional pattern, in which continuity and change operate at 
different scales – farm, state and nation – and combine old patterns of socio-ecological 
exploitation with modern production and well-crafted justification approaches. One the one 
hand, continuity is related to the concentration of agribusiness in the hands of MT’s large 
proprietors. Agrarian inequalities only exacerbate tensions relating to the ethnic origins of 
different groups of farmers. While the symbolic component of agribusiness is praised by political 
and economic leaders (most of whom have German and Italian heritage) as the belated 
redemption of the region from a past of isolation and backwardness maintained by a (non-white) 
regional population, there is evidence of racism, escalating hostilities and harassment of 
subsistence farmers and landless groups seeking to legalize their land. Mato Grosso was the state 
with the second highest level of rural violence in Brazil in 2014 (a trend that has persisted for 
many years), with 30 serious incidents involving 1,618 families, as well as six cases of water-
related conflicts (CPT, 2015).  
On the other hand, the agribusiness sector has demonstrated a great ability to dilute and 
deny its responsibility for mounting negative socio-ecological impacts. While neoliberalized 
agriculture maximizes the use of fossil fuels, biotechnology and agrochemicals, it also necessarily 
has to respond to environmental concerns and customer expectations (Otero, 2012). In MT the 
response has come in the form of a belated fondness for claims of sustainability and ecological 
modernization. The association of soybean producers published a bilingual booklet, On the Road 
to Sustainability, which emphasizes the environmental consciousness of soybean producers, citing 
in particular the concentration of production in savannah areas (rather than in the Amazon 
forest) and the adoption of integrated technologies. According to the association, “there is a 
strong correlation between soybean yield and macro socio-environmental indicators, such as the 
Human Development Index (HDI). The ten cities with the largest soybean production have rates 
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above the state and the country averages” (Aprosoja-MT, n/d: 11). In this way, agribusiness in 
MT has tried to reinvent itself as an environmentally sensitive sector, deeply concerned about the 
impact of its activity on the wellbeing of wider society.  
The surprising ‘environmental turn’ of the agribusiness sector has been accompanied by 
a search for national and, crucially, international recognition. In a talk at a workshop in the 
Wilson Center in Washington DC on 04 December 2008, the then governor Blairo Maggi (2003-
2010) provided a textbook defence of Mato Grosso’s ecological prerogatives. Leader of a family 
business established by his father a few decades earlier, when the clan moved from the south of 
Brazil to Mato Grosso, Maggi is the owner of one of the largest soybean companies in the world, 
responsible for around 5% of the total amount of soybean produced in the country, and 
increasingly involved in large public infrastructure, transnational trade and financial services. 
(Maggi was elected senator in 2010 and eventually replaced Senator Abreu in May 2016 as the 
new Secretary of State for Agriculture of the Michel Temer government.) At the Wilson Center, 
Maggi used his training as an agronomist to explain how technology helps to protect the 
environment, talked about the risks of anthropogenic climate change and the need to act “not 
because of the environmentalists, but because the scientists are now telling us the urgency and 
relevance of such issues”.  
Maggi articulates a passionate defence of market-friendly solutions, especially the role of 
payment for ecosystem services, carbons markets and the Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) scheme. “We must find a way to ensure that 
forests are more valuable standing than destroyed”, said Maggi (Wilson Center, 2009: 2). 
Governor Maggi stressed the urgency of creating such a mechanism. “Global warming has been 
scientifically proven; we no longer have the right to ignore climate change”. The appropriation of 
environmental claims to serve business and political interests is also evident in Maggi’s trajectory 
as a congressman. After becoming a senator in 2010, Maggi was one of the main advocates for 
the reform of the Forest Code, which was eventually approved in 2012 after a lengthy 
controversy and with detailed regulation introduced in 2014. The aim of the reform was to 
flexibilize the previous requirement to maintain a certain percentage of the natural vegetation on 
rural land. The reform means that it is now possible to compensate for deforestation on a rural 
property with another forested area elsewhere, which in practice ‘creates’ more cropland. The 
rationalization of socio-environmental regulation has followed specific economic interests and 
the logic of agro-neoliberal polices. It reveals the ‘agro’ being transformed and reshaped 
according to a powerful business rationality, which, as argued by Oliveira (2003), reproduces and 
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invigorates outdated features from previous stages of the long trajectory of the Brazilian 
capitalism. 
 
4. Future scenarios of agro-neoliberalism in Mato Grosso 
 The evolution of agro-neoliberalism in Brazil, and particularly in MT, has been 
permeated by undeniable achievements in terms of the expansion of the areas under cultivation 
and the increasing circulation of capital. Under the influence of a neoliberalizing platform, the 
sector is now one of the pillars of the national economy and the main driving-force of the Mato 
Grosso economy, particularly because of the export of soybean to Asian countries (Ioris, 2017). 
At the same time, the success of agribusiness is also counterbalanced by the extension of social 
and ecological impacts, the violence associated with the consolidation of the agricultural frontier 
and the need to constantly justify the concentration of land and opportunities. Considering the 
evidence available and the reaction of those contacted during the research, it is possible to expect 
that the evolution of the agro-neoliberalism in MT will either maintain its current trajectory of 
intensification and high profitability (possibly with the mitigation of the most evident impacts 
through the adoption of new technologies and the enforcement of the existing labour and 
environmental legislation), require more determined state interventions to mitigate mounting 
tensions, or that the sector will gradually decline with a reduction of productivity and production 
areas (possibly due to higher costs, phytosanitary risks or logistical difficulties).  It is obviously 
not possible to predict what will happen in the next decades, but the development of neoliberal 
agribusiness will certainly unfold according to the balance of power and other socio-ecological 
factors that simultaneously, and contradictorily, attempt to either promote or restraint crop 
production. If no significant problems occur, and given the macroeconomic relevance of primary 
exports for the Brazilian economy, agribusiness activity tend to retain its decisive position; 
however, there are signs of a growing reaction and discernible sources of risks that can also 
impose major difficulties for the persistence of current trends.  
 The majority of our interviews revealed this central dilemma between the 
accomplishments and the limitations of agro-neoliberal trends in Mato Grosso. Some 
respondents emphasized the negative aspects, while others were clearly impressed by the 
economic and social transformation of the region. Taking into account such diversity of opinions 
(note that the interviews had specific questions about current conditions and possible future 
developments) and the characteristics of an economic sector that depends so heavily on the 
cultivation of a few crops (soybean, cotton and maize, in special), it was possible to summarize 
the future of agribusiness in Mato Grosso under three main scenarios with a time horizon of 8-
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16 years (over the next one or two presidential mandates, including re-elections after 4 years), 
considering key reinforcing processes and potential disrupting events (also in Table 1): 
 
Scenario 1 – Expansion and consolidation of agro-neoliberalism  
 Because of the profitability and favourable prices in global markets, the production of 
soybean and other crops has continued to expand, though at lower rates than earlier when it 
reached 6% a.a. The sector managed to overcome the reduction of government funding and 
difficult market situations (as in the year 2005) through a successful mobilization of political 
forces, strategic alliances with transnational and national corporations (which are increasingly 
responsible for financial support), and the adoption of new technologies (such as genetically 
modified soybean and more efficient machinery). The agribusiness industry of Mato Grosso has 
occupied an important space in the environmental debate and appropriated the rhetoric of 
sustainability – although through a highly technocratic and non-political angle – what has helped 
to improve its image nationally and internationally. Instead of fighting the environmental 
regulators, the agribusiness sector has claimed to obey and to be a major ally of those concerned 
with ecological conservation. A stronger and less controversial agro-neoliberalism has echoed the 
calls for innovation and sustainable development put forward by Alegria (2005), which was 
considered an impetus toward greater collaboration between groups and organizations in more 
constructive and spirited ways. At the global level, it corresponded to the New Vision for 
Agriculture, defined by World Economic Forum partners in 2009, as technological and 
institutional adjustments sufficient to increase agriculture by 20% per decade until 2050; 
according to this vision, the main strategy was the leveraging of market-based approaches 
through coordinated efforts by all stakeholders, including farmers, government, civil society and 
the private sector. 
 
Scenario 2 – Return of strong government interventions  
This second scenario is actually a variation to the previous one, given that the apparatus 
of the Brazilian state has never really left the stage. On the contrary, the state remained the main 
player of agriculture production and regional development, as well as the main promoter of 
neoliberalizing policies, such as the integration with global markets, support to individual farmers 
and the privatization of roads and infrastructure. However, it was possible to envisage that 
because of acute market turbulence, reduced appetite of transnational corporations for the 
region or strong political pressure by the agribusiness community the state were again required to 
exercise more leadership and intervene more directly. As demonstrated in the global report 
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published by McIntyre et al. (2009), the state could resume its developmentalist role if necessary 
to overcome difficult situations and to coordinate efforts of different groups and sectors. That 
was proved indispensable particularly when local or national political groups questioned the 
political settlement that underpins the growth of agribusiness in Mato Grosso. In any case, such 
periods with stronger state initiatives did not necessarily cancel the wider evolution of agro-
neoliberalism, but represented a correction of excessed and transition to a new phase. 
 
Scenario 3 – Containment and decline of agro-neoliberalism 
 Contrasting with the previous scenarios, the internal contradictions and negative 
reactions to the elitist basis and uneven development of agro-neoliberalism in Mato Grosso (see 
Vieira et al., 2014) led to its weakening and even collapse. Similar disruptive situations had 
happened before in the environmental history of Brazil, as in the case of rubber, cocoa and (in 
recent years) orange production. There were many phytosanitary and environmental risks 
associated with the cultivation of large extension of land with a single crop and, in the case of 
soybean, almost a single variety of genetically modified plans. The biological vulnerability of 
monoculture were greatly aggravated by climatic changes that resulted in pronounced droughts, 
more intense rains and hotter growing seasons. In addition, there were unresolved and 
widespread conflicts in the main production areas of Mato Grosso related to land tenure, 
demands of indigenous tribes and uncertain conservation reserves. Those tensions re-emerged 
and intensified when new roads and hydropower schemes are proposed, which have been a 
regular occurrence (especially because of the attempt to reduce transportation costs through the 
improvement of roads and river navigation, as well as the construction of hydropower projects 
to respond to local and national electricity demands). Related to local disruptive events, national 
and international pressures for the reduction of deforestation, for a more stringent 
environmental regulation and for agro-ecological alternatives contributed for the decline of the 
agribusiness appeal.    
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The above three main scenarios – as narratives or images of the future – were developed 
independently, but these have important points of convergence with some of the scenarios 
developed by the Global Scenario Group (see Raskin et al., 2002) or comparable exercises, as the 
one conducted by Bourgeois (2015). Such international experts tried to envision possible 
directions of global change through a detailed assessment of key driving-forces, quantifiable 
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indicators, critical barriers and also desired outcomes (as in the case of a transition to higher 
levels of sustainability). The final report summarized their findings under three classes of 
scenarios, namely Conventional Worlds (no major changes in current market and policy 
trajectories), Barbarization (problems are not managed and crises are amplified) and Great 
Transitions (involving profound transformations of values and the organizing principles of 
society). Those overarching classes are further expanded into six scenarios, of which three seem 
to have relevance to the interrogation of the future of agribusiness in Mato Grosso. One is the 
scenario ‘Market Forces’ which is optimistic about market-based solutions and is fundamentally 
related to the self-correcting logic of competitive markets; this is closely connected with Scenario 
1 described above, that is, the continuous expansion of agro-neoliberalism. A second scenario 
put forward by the Global Scenario Group is ‘Policy Reform’ which entails stronger policy 
guidance and renewed government actions; this has correspondence with Scenario 2, which 
describes the return of direct interventions by the state apparatus.  
Finally, the international report presents a future scenario described as ‘Breakdown’, 
basically the collapse market forces and the systemic failure of government initiatives, leading to 
conflicts and fragmentation. This last scenario has disturbing parallel with Scenario 3 above, 
which projects the rapid decline of agribusiness in Mato Grosso due to mounting management 
contradictions and the barriers offered by nature. It is an aim of the scenario community to 
determine which scenario is more likely (Öborn et al., 2011), but perhaps it should be pointed 
out that, since the early days of conquest and exploitation, the Amazon region has been marked 
by violent transformations shaped by mercantile dynamics and the exploitation of its socio-
ecological features (Little, 2001). If the experience of the past four centuries can be used to 
speculate about the future, it may be possible to expect that in the next decades neoliberalized 
agribusiness in the southern Amazon region, as in Mato Grosso, would be compromised and 
perhaps collapse due to its intrinsic vulnerabilities and the impossibility to harmonize clashes and 
tensions through market or state mediation. This third, distressing scenario will essentially be the 
actualisation, through the advance and downfall of agro-neoliberalism, of this long-lasting 
tradition of violence against local peoples and their socionatural relations that has long marked 
the geography of the Amazon.  
 
5. Conclusions: The frontiers and the prospects of agro-neoliberalism 
The previous pages discussed the transition from the Fordist-development intensification 
of agriculture in the post-World War II decades to a post-Fordist, agro-neoliberal model of 
agribusiness production since the 1980s in Brazil. Based on the evidence, it can be concluded 
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that this transition follows the introduction of new forms of public-private association, novel 
forms of socio-ecological exploitation and the suppression of alternatives to hegemonic 
agribusiness production. The Brazilian experience illustrates how agro-neoliberalism flourishes in 
a context of market-centred solutions and regulatory flexibility, but also that it demands novel 
forms of government support and relies on some of the oldest political traditions (e.g. aggressive 
manipulation of party politics, lack of transparency, deceitful claims of progress and elements of 
racism). The image of success is daily reaffirmed by sector representatives and endorsed by the 
national government in its effort to gain political support and maintain the export revenues 
generated by agribusiness. The various techno-economic innovations adopted by agribusiness 
players – including land and gene grabs, biotechnology and genetically modified organisms, 
dispossession of common land, financialization and administration of production by TNCs – are 
all strategies that emerge from business and political interactions, which combine old and new 
features of the capitalist economy. The result is a nuanced and highly contested situation that 
connects, often in unexpected ways, different scales, sectors and public policies articulated 
around agro-neoliberalism. 
Taking into account the complexity of achievements and failures, it is possible to verify 
that the true extent of agro-neoliberalism’s success is highly questionable. The problems 
associated with the neoliberalization of agriculture include a lack of access to affordable, 
nutritious food; the impacts of agro-chemicals on communities and ecosystems; and the 
enormous concentration of power held by a small number of mega-supermarkets and agri-food 
corporations to control food production, distribution and consumption. While the neoliberal 
agribusiness sector has succeeded in crafting a positive image of technological and economic 
success, the federal government and the wider business community have become highly 
dependent on the export of primary commodities (to safeguard the national currency and avoid 
trade deficits, for example). Agro-neoliberalism evolves not only through attempts to influence 
the government, but also through further modification to the structure and rationale of the state. 
As part of this turbulent and controversial process, new production areas are being incorporated 
with the employment of old and new practices of socio-environmental management and political 
legitimization. It is particularly in agricultural frontier areas, such as Mato Grosso, that the 
rationale of agro-neoliberalism is used to combine populist and neo-developmentalist traditions 
in order to disguise mounting impacts and inequalities. Ironically, when facing criticism from 
other social forces in the country, the agribusiness sector reacts with a pre-established rhetoric of 
heroism and entrepreneurialism that, in the end, serves the corporations and national politicians 
more than the farmers themselves. Agro-neoliberalism has been especially successful at the 
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agriculture frontier because it is in itself an economic, ecological and ethical frontier, in which 
interpersonal and intersectoral relations have a particular configuration and impose undemocratic 
measures due to the primacy of production and the emphasis on rapid capital accumulation.  
The first of the three future scenarios examined above – synthetically generated from the 
information acquired during the research in the country – suggest that agribusiness can continue 
to expand and further consolidate its influence as a strategic economic sector. This scenario 
echoes the current trend of growing soybean exports, conversion of pastures into monoculture 
grain fields and concentration of opportunities in the hands of large-scale farmers and associated 
transnational corporations. It basically represents the affirmation of a pre-cooked future that is 
politically used to justify the distortions and inequalities of the present. This mythical future, 
which is prearranged according to the opportunities and conveniences of agri-neoliberal agendas, 
has locked-in the narrow, anti-ecological production system. Furthermore, the rhetorical and 
material practices of agro-neoliberalism in Brazil represent the promise of a future that can never 
be fulfilled, as it brings back the worst features of the past (including legacies of slavery, over-
exploitation of labour and resources, socio-ecological degradation and systemic violence used as 
a political tool). In the context of this scenario it is difficult to envisage the emergence of any 
radical and genuine alternative that privileges social justice and the production of basic food. It 
seems that the two other plausible scenarios either comprise the return of more direct state 
interventions (to some extent, maintaining elements of agro-neoliberalising trends), or the 
collapse of agro-neoliberal agribusiness due to environmental and social tensions. Any other 
development would require a strong coordination of national and international social groups and 
political will to construct a different future for farmers, consumers and wider society. The future 
is wide open and will necessarily unfold according to complex social and socio-ecological 
interactions and to the evolution of the balance of power. Nonetheless, if in the end something 
like the first scenario prevails, it will be a disturbing demonstration that, because of the serious 
impacts of agro-neoliberalism in Brazil, the country will continue to harvest its exclusionary past 
and will be planting a narrow future for most. 
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Appendix  
 
The empirical data used for the development of the scenarios and overall analysis were 
obtained during three fieldwork campaigns conducted between 2013 and 2016, which comprised 
repeated visits to cropping areas and plantation farms, private companies, research centres and 
indigenous and subsistence farming communities, as well as attendance at public meetings and 
semi-structured interviews carried out in the city of São Paulo (where the representatives of the 
main agribusiness entities, social movements and corporations are based) and in the state of 
Mato Grosso (in the municipalities of Cuiabá [the state capital], Rondonópolis, Sinop, Cláudia, 
Campo Novo do Parecis, Porto dos Gaúchos, Juína, Lucas do Rio Verde and Sorriso). Two sets 
of questions were prepared, one for national players in São Paulo and one for farmers and local 
authorities in Mato Grosso (all participants in those two broad clusters of social groups were 
asked similar questions about the process of change, about public policies and the negotiation of 
conflicts, and about impacts and future trends, although the wording of the questions differed 
according to the national or regional geographical focus). With the tacit help of local academics, 
interviewees and informants were identified, initial contacts were set up, and the research then 
followed a snowball approach. With the mapping of sectors and organisations, their discourse 
and stated aims, it was possible to compare intra- and inter-group differences and the range of 
alliances or disputes (ranging from those strongly against to others fiercely in favour of the 
prevailing agri-food system among agribusiness farmers, subsistence farmers, urban populations, 
agro-industrial entrepreneurs, policy-makers and politicians, representative agents, and the 
general population). Semi-structured interviews were complemented with analysis of documents, 
statistics, websites, leaflets, presentations and newspaper articles found in university libraries and 
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in the archives of public agencies and private entities. Interviews and other qualitative material 
were transcribed, coded and assessed in Portuguese (only the extracts reproduced in the book 
were translated into English). Empirical data were analysed, searching for evidence of the 
configuration and advance of agro-neoliberalism, rhetorical and material manifestations of power 
relations, and signs of problems, tensions and subtle evidences of change. 
